Our work focuses on exploiting Twitter's content to predict the 2014 EU election results in Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece (for more information, see the "EU Elections" sidebar). While several works have been conducted in this domain, many relied strictly on Twitter data and have been proven ineffective when tested in different elections (see the "Related Work in Election Prediction with Twitter" sidebar). Furthermore, most past works published their results after the elections, whereas others raised questions on the benefit of using Twitter data for this task. 1 In this work, we treat users' voting intentions as time-variant features. Instead of trying to predict every user's vote, we treat Twitter political discussions as a general index that varies with time; we define several Twitterbased features and fit them in time-series models, using opinion polls as our ground truth. In this way, we combine the Twitter-based time series with the poll-based ones. We tested three different forecasting algorithms using three different sets of features and contrasted our results with several popular methods, achieving lower error rates even when compared to prediction websites and polls. By working on different elections at the same time, we also demonstrate our approach's portability. Most importantly, we show that by using T witter is an immensely popular microblogging social platform whose users post approximately 500 million short messages per day (https://about. twitter.com/company). Hence, it isn't surprising that it's increasingly exploited for various research tasks, including modeling and predicting users' behavior.
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the proposed Twitter-based features, all tested algorithms get a significant boost in accuracy as compared to using only poll-based features. We're among the first to have published our predictions before the announcement of the exit polls for one country (Greece; http:// socialsensor.eu/news/132-socialsensoreu-elections-predictions).
Methodology
Approaching our problem as a multivariate time-series forecasting task for each country separately, we created time series of 11 Twitter-and one poll-based feature for every party. An example is the number of tweets mentioning a certain party on a specific day (Twitterbased) and the percentage of that party reported on a poll that was conducted on that day (poll-based). Next, we provided all these features as input to different forecasting algorithms to predict every party's voting share separately.
Data aggregation
We started aggregating data published on Twitter and various opinion polls on a per-country basis from 6 April until two days before the elections (20 May for the Netherlands and 23 May for Germany and Greece), leaving one day to conduct our processing. Using the public Twitter Streaming API (https://dev.twitter.com), we aggregated tweets written in the respective language that contained a party's name, its abbreviation, its Twitter account name, and some possible misspellings (such as grunen instead of grünen). We excluded several ambiguous keywords to reduce noise (for example, the abbreviation of the Dutch party "GL" could stand for "good luck"), which might slightly affect the replication of naïve counting-based methods. The aggregated tweet IDs are available at http://mklab.iti.gr/project/euelections-2014-prediction-dataset.
Modeling
We extracted several Twitter-based features that potentially disclose users' voting intentions. These features were based on past works, showing that the counts of a political party on Twitter and the expressed sentiment toward it are-to some extent-related to its voting share in elections. However, instead of relying strictly on counting-based methods, we incorporated daily features into time series to correlate them to the opinion polls (discussed next).
Working on every country separately, we first assigned equal weights to all parties mentioned in a tweet, so that they summed up to one. 2 We used these 11 values for every party as our Twitter-based features and provided them as input to our algorithms, along with the opinion poll ones.
Because there isn't a complete polling aggregation service, we had to find different polls manually. Once aggregated, we removed all poll values from "small" parties (not appearing in all polls) and added their voting share to the "others" bucket, given that we were interested in only the main parties of each country. Next, we distributed proportionally to all parties (including "others") the voting share of all "undecided" voters. In this way, we managed to have consistent polls, adjusting their reports to include only the main political parties of each country, along with the "others."
While creating time series of Twitter features without missing values was a straightforward process, this wasn't the case for the polls. A poll is usually conducted over two to three days; we treated the adjusted results as the actual voting shares each party would have received if the elections were held on any of these days. If two or more polls were held on the same day, we considered each party's voting share as the weighted average value, using the sample size of every poll as the weight and making sure that all voting shares summed to 100. We then filled all days without polling data by using linear interpolation. Finally, for the days after the last poll, we replicated the last poll-based value for every party to set the prediction horizon to 1 for our E U parliament elections are held every five years among the member states. Elections take place almost simultaneously across Europe, and people vote for the national parties of their countries. The 2014 EU elections were judged as extremely important, in light of the economic crisis and the rise of Euroscepticism. Due to the nature of these elections, it's difficult to predict the results at a pan-European level without taking into account the important demographic and political differences between EU members. Thus, we focused on three different countries, transferring the problem to a national level. The elections were held on 22 May for the Netherlands and on 25 May for Germany and Greece. Ten political parties were up for voting in the Netherlands, six in Germany, and eight in Greece.
eU elections P r e d i c t i v e A n A l y t i c s predictive algorithms, thus achieving consistency between the different countries. There was only one such day (that is, the last day) for Germany and the Netherlands.
Sentiment analysis
Several Twitter-based features were sentiment-related, so we needed to assign a sentiment value to each tweet before proceeding. One of the most popular approaches of sentiment analysis is to train a classifier on a labeled corpus of tweets and apply it to the desired test set. However, past works reveal the domain-dependent nature of such classifiers. 3 The integration of part-of-speech (POS) tags is also beneficial, but no reliable, free-to-use POS tagger exists for all three languages. Given these constraints, we decided to adopt a lexicon-based approach to create a generic method that could be applied in different cases. Although such approaches perform only slightly better than a random classifier, 4 we were interested only in the daily differences of the expressed sentiment; thus, given that we have enough data on every day, even a slightly better than the random classifier method could fit our goals. 2 Due to the lack of a sentiment lexicon for different languages, we translated three English lexicons using Google Translate (https://translate. google.com). These included SentiWordNet (http://sentiwordnet.isti.cnr. it; 150,000 synsets with a double value indicating their polarity), Opinion Lexicon (www.cs.uic.edu/~liub/FBS/ sentiment-analysis.html; 6,800 polarized terms), and the Subjectivity Lexicon that serves as part of the Opinion Finder (http://mpqa.cs.pitt.edu/ opinionfinder; 8,000 terms along with their POS, subjectivity-strong/ weak-and polarity indication).
We assigned the values of 1 and −1 for the positive and negative terms in the Opinion Lexicon, respectively; for the Subjectivity Lexicon, we used four values (−1, −0.5, 0.5, 1) to represent every subjective word based on subjectivity (|0.5| for weak, |1| for strong) and polarity; for SentiWordNet, we kept the values of every synset. We removed all terms that weren't a single word, due to the inaccuracy observed in those translations. If the same word appeared in different lexicons, we considered the average as its sentiment value, resulting in 14,060/19,357 German, 13,838/18,993 Dutch, and 13,582/18,356 Greek positive/negative terms. To detect a tweet's sentiment, we used a naïve sumof-weights method on its keywords according to the respective lexicon, and assigned the majority class label ( positive/negative) to it.
algorithms
We tested three different algorithms on each political party separately, using only this specific party's features (11 Twitter-and one poll-based) as input. These algorithms were linear regression, Gaussian process, and sequential minimal optimization for regression, all implemented using Weka (www. cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/) with the default settings (our released results included a fourth algorithm, support vector regression; due to its poor A seminal work on the problem of predicting election results was performed by Andranik Tumasjan and his colleagues, who demonstrated that the number of times the name of a political party appears on Twitter is a fairly good estimate of its voting share. However, their method wasn't generalizable to other cases. 1 Naïve counting and sentiment analysis methods didn't perform well either: Panagiotis Metaxas and his colleagues predicted the correct result, with two candidates, in only half of the cases. 2 Recent Twitter-based works use opinion polls as ground truth. Lei Shi and his colleagues used aggregated poll reports to train their Twitter-based models by also examining users' geographical locations in an attempt to predict results per location. 3 However, sentiment analysis features, which are considered to be important for this task, weren't included in their modelling. Using poll reports as ground truth, Vasileios Lampos and his colleagues created time series by considering both user-and keyword-based features for the major parties of two countries 4 ; however, their evaluation is performed against pollsters and not the actual results. Erik Sang and Johan Bos tuned their Twitter-based data on polls, but achieved slightly worse results. 5 More disturbingly, when they replaced their Twitter-based features with uniform variables, their predictions got better, implying that Twitter didn't actually help in the prediction task. Daniel Gayo-Avello's work offers a more complete review. 6 performance in Greece, we didn't test it on the other countries). Because it was difficult to evaluate each algorithm before the elections, we initially decided to empirically apply a seven-day training window for every algorithm and considered the average predicted percentage for every party as our final estimate.
Data
The features previously described were extracted from Twitter and opinion poll data. Here, we describe both sets of data.
Twitter
We aggregated 361,713 tweets from 74,776 users in Germany, 452,348 from 74,469 users in the Netherlands, and 263,465 from 19,789 users in Greece. Our findings on the average sentiment value reveal that negative opinions dominate in political discussions (−0.54 for Germany, −1.09 for the Netherlands, and −0.29 for Greece). Figure 1 shows that there were far more tweets published in the week before the elections, whereas a slight decrease is noticed in the Easter week (13 to 20 April). Still, due to the restrictions of the Twitter Streaming API (it returns no more than 1 percent of all public tweets), we could have missed some data. Research has shown that the increase of global awareness on a topic, or the sudden decrease in tweets on a day, could result in a decrease in the Streaming API's coverage and, consequently, lead to a noisy bias. 5 However, because the total amount of aggregated data is fairly moderate, our data loss (if any) is probably negligible. Moreover, because we're only interested in time-series modeling, this shouldn't affect our process.
Opinion polls
In total, we used 26 different polls from 11 diverse sources in Greece, nine from four sources in Germany, and 13 polls from three sources in the Netherlands. More specifically, we used all the polls published in MetaPolls (http:// metapolls.net); further resources included www.wahlrecht.de for Germany, www.3comma14.gr for Greece, and polls from Ipsos (www.ipsos-nederland.nl), TNS Nipo (www.tns-nipo. com), and Peil (https://www.noties.nl/ peil.nl) for the Netherlands. Table 2 shows the variance of every party's voting share based on all collected poll results after our preprocessing (for the Netherlands, the "others" category was missing in most polls and thus not included in our analysis). The voting shares of the German parties are rather stable, unlike the percentages reported for the Dutch and the Greek parties, reflecting the differences in people's voting intentions through time. Not surprisingly, because polls were part of our training process, we achieved lower error rates in Germany than in the other countries (see next section).
Results
Here, we present the results obtained from our method (denoted as Twitter-poll-based, or TPB), along with several other competing methods. We used a combination of established naïve methods, past works, commercial resources, and our method when leaving some features out:
• CB1. The count-based method, which predicts the voting share of every party based on the number of times this party has been mentioned in last week's tweets. 6 • CB2. A similar naïve method, 1 applied by keeping the tweets that mention only one party and then every user's first tweet. At the final stage, voting shares are given to the parties as in CB1. In both CB cases, because we didn't have data for the last day before the elections, we worked on the last seven days for which we had data (the week ending two days before the elections).
• SB. In this replication of other work, 1 we train on all polls before the last week. For sentiment analysis, we use our own naïve dictionary-based method. In the original work, sentiment values are given to the parties after manual annotation of some tweets. Nevertheless, these sentiment values are then adjusted to the "population weights," so our sentiment analysis choice shouldn't affect the results.
• Polls. The average of the polls conducted during the last processing week; due to different companies publishing their poll results at the same time, we provide the average of their reports. There was one poll 
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in Germany, two in the Netherlands, and seven in Greece.
• MP. This baseline refers to the predictions of MetaPolls. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of only two websites providing predictions for all EU countries. To evaluate both the voting share predictions of the competing methods and the ranking of the parties, we selected the standard mean absolute error (MAE), the mean squared error (MSE), and the tau Kendall coefficient (ta) as our evaluation metrics. Table 3 presents all the results together, along with the average per-country values of our evaluation metrics.
As expected, naïve methods perform the worst. While in the previous work, CB2 provided a boost in accuracy compared to CB1 against polls, 1 our findings show that this accuracy drops against the actual results. Surprisingly, though, these approaches are the most successful for certain parties: CB2 is the best method for four of the 26 parties; despite that, it's the worst method overall.
SB fails to perform competitively compared to other approaches. Although this might be influenced by the different sentiment analysis method used, it mainly suggests the importance of computing people's voting intentions as time-variant features instead of as static values.
Polls' error values vary a lot among the three different countries. In Germany, polls were the second best predictor for the final result, in terms of MAE. However, in both Greece and the Netherlands, they performed relatively poorly compared to other pollbased methods. This is an interesting point: although our models (TPB, PB, and CPB) used polls for training, they managed to outperform polls in both error metrics by using knowledge from the past. Given that every poll has a standard error (usually around 3 percent) along with a certain number of undecided voters, treating polls (next to other features) as time series seems a better practice. Overall, only two (out of 10) polls conducted during the last week achieved better results in MAE than our TPB approach (one in Greece, with MAE 1.35, and one in the Netherlands, with MAE 1.78). Moreover, polls have the second highest ta value; however, the differences among most models are minor. From the two prediction websites, MP outperformed PW by a margin of 0.33 in MAE. The most likely reason for this big difference is that MP released its predictions one day before the elections, whereas PW published them on 20 May for all countries.
Overall, our TPB model performed the best in both error rate terms. However, it didn't perform equally well in terms of correct ranking of the parties, following by 0.03 the best competing model (PB) in ta. One possible explanation for this effect is that-as we weren't interested in correctly ranking the political parties, but instead predicted their voting shares individually-only the features related to an individual party were used for its prediction. Using features from different parties to predict each party's voting share is a challenging task for future research.
From the three algorithms used in TPB-not presented in Table 3 due to space limitations-Gaussian process achieved the lowest MAE (1.31), followed by sequential minimal optimization (1.35) and linear regression (1.42). This means that Gaussian process performed better than our "averaging" TPB model. However, because we didn't know how reliable the polls were, we didn't have a guaranteed ground truth before the elections, and the averaging method seemed a safer choice.
Importantly, the comparisons between TPB and PB (and TPB and CPB, *The first column contains the actual election results, and the next columns present respectively the predictions using the two count-based methods (CB1 and CB2), the method by Sang and Bos (SB), the average of last week's polls (Polls), the MetaPolls (MP) and PollWatch (PW) polls, and our counting poll-based (CBP) and Twitter poll-based (TBP) methods. Predictions with the lowest mean absolute and square error (MAE and MSE, respectively) and Kendall tau per party are in bold.
www.computer.org/intelligent IEEE INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS P r e d i c t i v e A n A l y t i c s respectively) show that our Twitter features were beneficial. However, the differences between error rates are rather small. Furthermore, in the case of the Netherlands, PB and CPB achieved better results. So, although our approach achieved the best results overall, the exact contribution of Twitter and sentiment features needs to be further explored.
Post Hoc Analysis and Discussion
Recall that all of our models (TPB, PB, and CPB) were based on a sevenday training window and the average of the predictions by linear regression, Gaussian process, and sequential minimal optimization for regression as reported in Table 3 . Both of these decisions (window size and averaging) were made empirically: we didn't know the actual results. To better compare these models, we applied the same algorithms trained on five different window sizes (starting from one week, with weekly increases of training size up to five weeks). Figure 2 presents the MAE values for all countries and for all algorithms (including our averaging-AVG-approach) when trained on different sets of features (leading to TPB, PB, and CPB models) and on different time windows. In most cases, the error drops when we use our complete TPB model's features; this holds in 71 percent of the total cases for the individual algorithms (12/15 for LR and 10/15 for GP and SMO) and 67 percent for the "averaging" method (10/15). We also notice that, in most cases, the errors follow a downward trend as the training window size increases. Hence, training over a wider period seems beneficial, although finding the optimal window remains a challenging task for future research.
On a per-window size, cross-country average, linear regression performs consistently worse than Gaussian process and sequential minimal optimization in all feature models (the only exception being for TPB in the two-week training window), indicating that it was a poor choice to include it in our models. The differences between Gaussian process and sequential minimal optimization are minor. Using our TPB model's features, Gaussian process achieves more stable MAE values across different window sizes, with a cross-country average from 1.21 (five weeks) to 1.31 (one week); however, for the same features, the best cross-country performance in MAE terms is achieved by sequential minimal optimization (1.20 for the five-week training window size).
Despite the better overall performance of all algorithms comprising our TPB model as compared to PB and CPB (see Figure 2) , we need to further test for significant differences between the different models. Thus, we applied the nonparametric Wilcoxon test (twotailed) to all three algorithms, as well as our averaging initial approach, using the MAEs and MSEs obtained by every algorithm on every country and training window size.
Comparing TPB and PB revealed that, for all three algorithms as well as the averaging approach, there exist significant differences in MAE for the level of .05. The same test of the respective MSEs revealed significant differences for the .05 level for linear regression, Gaussian process, and the averaging approach, but not for sequential minimal optimization (p = .057). Comparing TPB with the CPB MAE rates revealed significant differences for the .05 level for all methods except sequential minimal optimization; for the same level, the differences for all algorithms and our averaging method were significant when applied to the MSE rates. These results highlight the importance of all our Twitter-with sentiment-based features: by incorporating them into our prediction models, we achieve better error rates and, in most cases, significant differences from the models that use only polls or polls with count-based (no-sentiment) features. Given that our work was unbiased toward the election results, these conclusions provide highly supportive evidence on the potential of using social media data for the election prediction task.
F uture work includes fine-tuning the training window size, incorporating network-based features for the users, using features from different parties, and creating a more accurate method for sentiment analysis. We've already collected data from the Facebook pages of the political parties, and we will try to exploit them for the same task. Given that we have enough data for this purpose, we plan to fit a model to the actual results for one country and test it on the others, in an attempt to analyze if generic Twitter-based-only solutions are possible.
